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SECURITIES
OVERVIEW

During the period covered by this survey, the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was presented with five cases to review under the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act) 1 and the Securities and Exchange Commission Act of 1934
(1934 Act). 2 In four published opinions, 3 the court followed established
precedents and clarified its position on scienter, statutes of limitations, and
damages. Specifically, the court found reckless behavior sufficient to satisfy
the scienter requirement of Rule lOb-5; 4 required scienter to be pleaded and
proved in an SEC injunction action; 5 delineated the nature of due diligence
required to toll the statute of limitations;6 and clarified the extent to which a
benefit-of-the-bargain measure of damages is appropriate in Rule lOb-5
7
violations.
I.

RECKLESS BEHAVIOR SATISFIES SCIENTER
REQUIREMENT OF RULE

10B-5

In Hackbart v. Holmes' the most notable decision of the past year, the
court found reckless conduct sufficient to establish the necessary element of
scienter required by Rule 10b-5. 9 Hackbart, the plaintiff, in alleging securi1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
3. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Mick Stack Assoc., 675
F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Haswell, 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
In an unpublished opinion, Hyden v. Baxter, Nos. 79-1670, 79-1671 (10th Cir. Sept. 30,
1981), the Tenth Circuit court affirmed the district court's finding of a violation of the registration provisions of the 1933 Act. The defendant, an owner of a working interest in certain oil
and gas leases, sold fractional interests in the operation to numerous investors who previously
had participated in an uncompleted project on the same properties. The court upheld the trial
court's findings that the defendant had entered into a new agreement with the previous operators, and had not merely succeeded to an assignment.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the interest sold was not a security. However, because the interests sold were fractional undivided interests in oil and gas, they were specifically
covered by the 1933 Act's definition of a security. The court held that the interests would also
qualify as an investment contract, subject to registration requirements. Id. slip op. at 7. Because defendant had entered into a new agreement with the former operators, he had sold
rather than exchanged securities with existing holders. This sale brought his actions within the
definition of "issuer" under 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1), (4) (1976). Hydmn, slip op. at 6. The transaction
was not exempt from registration because the court characterized the transaction as a sale and
not an exchange. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (Supp. V 1981) (providing an exemption for an
issuer who merely exchanges securities with its existing security holders). Cross-appeals alleging
error for dismissing claims against a third party and for failure to award attorneys' fees and
costs were rejected. Hyden, slip op. at 8, 11.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1982); see Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982).
5. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Mick Stack Assoc., 675
F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982).
6. Loveridge v. Dreagoux, 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d
1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
7. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
8. Id
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982) provides:
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ties fraud under Rule lOb-5 sought to recover "his share" of a tire wholesaling company in which he had invested. Hackbart was a friend and former
football teammate of the defendant Holmes. In late 1971, knowing that
Hackbart's football career was nearly over, Holmes presented him with the
possibility of forming a partnership to operate a Denver tire dealership. Initially, an equal partnership was agreed upon, but Holmes later insisted on
fifty-one percent ownership to maintain control.10 The defendant agreed
with his attorney's proposal to issue Hackbart preferred stock. This preferred stock was void of any preferences that would allow Hackbart to share
in corporate growth. Once Hackbart proved his business acumen, the board
of directors, controlled by the defendant, would convert the preferred stock
to common stock. Neither the defendant nor his attorney adequately explained the significance of this change to the plaintiff. I I
The business prospered, evidenced by the addition of new stores. In
1977, the two had a "falling out," and they decided that Hackbart would
not remain with the corporation. ' 2 The plaintiff requested "his share" of the
corporate growth, but discovered that he was entitled only to his original
contribution. t3
The trial court held that the defendant's failure to explain clearly the
rights of the preferred stock was a "manipulative or deceptive device" proscribed by Rule lOb-5.t 4 The court also concluded that recklessness satisfied
Rule lOb-5's scienter requirements, and that the defendant acted recklessly
in not assuring the plaintiff's understanding of the new terms of the deal.' 5
The recognition of an implied private right of action for damages under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in 194616 began a trend toward a liberal interpretation of the proscription found in the federal securities laws. This liberal
interpretation resulted from the perception that the securities laws are remedial and are to be construed flexibly in order to protect investors.' 7 NeverIt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or

instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,

(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or

would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.

10. 675 F.2d at 1118.
11. Id The defendant relied upon his attorney to explain the effect of the issuance of preferred stock, instead of the common stock originally agreed upon. The trial court found the
attorney's explanation inadequate. Id

12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 1117.
Id.
Id
Id.

16. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The Supreme
Court has never directly ruled on this issue. It has, however, recognized the existence of the
implied right on several occasions. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967).
17. See Note,Juat:alRetrenchment Under Rule 10b-5 An End to the Rule as Law?, 1976 DUKE
L. J. 789, 792-94 [hereinafter Juat;'cil Retrenchment]; Note, Recklessness and the Rule /0b-5 Scienter
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theless, beginning with the 1975 term, the Supreme Court has been
retrenching from its position. ' 8 In a number of successive decisions the Court
has made it clear that the previous expansion of the class of plaintiffs who
may sue under Rule lOb-5 will no longer be countenanced.' 9
20
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
three circuits had adopted a negligence standard for Rule lob-5 private
damage actions. 2 1 Although not specifically rejecting a negligence standard,
the Hochfelder Court avoided an approach that would allow for flexible construction of Rule lOb-5. The Court relied entirely on statutory construction
and congressional intent to establish that a finding of scienter 22 was a necessary prerequisite to liability under Rule lOb-5. 23 The Court concluded that
negligence did not satisfy the standard, but specifically reserved the question
whether recklessness was sufficient conduct to fall under Rule lob-5. 24 Subsequent to Hochfelder, the federal appellate courts addressing the issue have
25
overwhelmingly agreed that recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement.
Until Hackbart, the Tenth Circuit court never directly addressed the issue of whether reckless conduct was sufficient to meet the scienter requirement of Rule l0b-5. In affirming the trial court's decision in Hackbart, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that proof of reckless behavior
Standard After Hochfelder, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 817 n. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Recklessness and
Rule /0b-5]. See also Spence, Civil Liability Under Rule lOb-5. The Supreme Court Acts to Curb a
Burgeoning Source of Liability, 52 L.A.B.J. 326 (1977).
18. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), the Supreme Court
held that only actual purchasers or sellers of securities could maintain a private damages action
under Rule lOb-5.
19. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hocifelder,
425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). See generally
Kaler, Seenter After Hochfelder: Recklessness as a Standard in Rule 10b-5 PrivateDamage Actions, 6 J.
CORP. L. 337 (1981); NoteJudicial Retrenchment, supra note 17, at 794-800.
20. 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33 (1976).
21. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), reu'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976);
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). These decisions relied on the "remedial nature" rationale
of earlier Supreme Court decisions. See Kaler, supra note 19, at 339. The tendency for definitions of recklessness to merge into that of mere negligence also has been cited as a reason for the
departure from the requirements of common law fraud. See Newton, The Limits of Liability.
RecentJudicial Restrictions on Rule /0b-5, 6 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 63, 90 (1978) and supra note 16 and
accompanying text.
22. The term scienter derives from the common law tort of deceit. Scienter in this context
is the "intent to deceive, to mislead, to convey a false impression." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 700 (4th ed. 1971). It was this element that was stressed in the
seminal English stock fraud case of Derry v. Peek, 14 A.C. 337 (1889). There, scienter was held
to be satisfied by knowledge that the representation was false or a reckless disregard for its truth
or falsity. Id at 374 (per Lord Herschell).
23. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12. The Hochfelder Court defined scienter as it is applicable to
actions under the federal securities laws as a "mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id.
24. Id
25. Se G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981); McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017
(6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978);
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978);
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp. 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875
(1977).
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was sufficient. 26 The court adopted the recklessness standard for the same
reasons given by other circuits: 27 the securities acts require broad construction to achieve their remedial goals; 28 the burden of proving intent would be
onerous; 29 the securities acts were intended to proscribe actions akin to common law fraud; 30 and proof of reckless behavior satisfies the scienter requirement of common law fraud. 3 1 The court's adoption of the recklessness
standard is hardly surprising. Although confusion exists over the proper interpretation of some early cases, the Tenth Circuit court's adoption of this
standard follows logically from a long trend that has required culpability
greater than negligence, 32 but less than outright intent. 33 The question re26. 675 F.2d at 1117.
27. Id at 1117-18.
28. Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1024 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 408 U.S. 128, 151 (1972)). In light of the recent change in
Supreme Court policy, the continued validity of this rationale is to be questioned. See supra text
accompanying notes 19-20, 22-23.
29. G. A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. See Ernst &Ernst, 425 U.S. at 212 n.32 (legislative history shows SEC believed the rule
would proscribe fraudulent behavior); see also supra note 21.
31. Mansbach, 598 F.2d at 1024.
32. Early Tenth Circuit cases often are interpreted as holding that negligence was sufficient. See generally Note, Evolving Standards of Personal Liability and Scienter Under Rule lOb-5, 16
WASHBURN L.J. 344, 357-58 (1977). Later cases implicitly adopted a reckless standard.
In Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965), the court held that "[ilt is not necessary to allege or prove common law fraud to make out a case under the statute and rule. It is
only necessary to prove one of the prohibited actions such as the material misstatement of fact
or the omission to state a material fact." Id. at 379.
Several years later, the court opined:
One is not to be held liable, however, because of his misleading misrepresentation or
omission of material fact, the truth of the matter being unknown to the purchaser, if
the party responsible for the misrepresentation or omission sustains the burden of
proving that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known that
it was a misrepresentation or ommstsion. (Emphasis added).
Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348, 357 (10th Cir. 1970). Although the court mentioned scienter,
the language definitely sounds like negligence. In fairness, Gilbert was confusing because of the
court's attempt to reconcile § 12(2) of the 1933 Act with the requirements of Rule lOb-5. Id. at
356-57. However, in Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971), the court specifically adopted the language of Gilbert as applied to Rule
lOb-5 actions. 446 F.2d at 102. The court prefaced its holding with the statement that some
degree of scienter was required. (Mitchell also rejected application of the State Blue Sky Law
statute of limitations in favor of the applicable state limitation period for fraud, because fraud
required scienter. Id at 103-04).
In Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. dented, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), the
Tenth Circuit court attempted to explain and harmonize the earlier cases. This opinion recognized and explicitly rejected the negligence interpretations of the earlier cases. The analysis
largely limited the broad language of each case to that case's specific facts. 507 F.2d at 1355-61.
This clarification of the Tenth Circuit's did not solve the entire problem. It remained for the
court to embrace recklessness as sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement.
Recklessness was implicitly recognized by the court as sufficient on four separate occasions
prior to Hackbart. In Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), the court stated that "[w]illful or intentional misconduct or the
equivalent thereof [are] essential to recovery" in a Rule lOb-5 action. 549 F.2d at 169 (emphasis
added).
In Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1979), a case involving SEC
suspension of a broker-dealer for violations of the 1933 Act, the court noted that a finding of
recklessness in an action under that Act was in accordance with the Hochfelder decision. Id at
596-97.
In Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1980), the court acknowledged that other circuits had recognized recklessness as equivalent to
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mained, however, of how to define recklessness.
The definitions of recklessness adopted by the circuits have not been
uniform. 34 The dissemblance arises from Hochfelder's ambiguous definition
of scienter. Justice Powell, writing for the Hochfelder majority, first defined
scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. ' ' 35 Later in the opinion, Justice Powell also stated that the language
of section 10(b) strongly suggested it was intended to proscribe "knowing or
intentional misconduct." ' 36 Thus, after Hochfeldr, scienter would seem to
include at least two criteria: knowledge and state of mind. 3 7 With such
ambiguity surrounding the definition of scienter, interpreting and applying
38
a standard of recklessness has been a dilemma for circuit courts of appeal.
The different approaches by the circuits led to a number of formulations, the typologies for which are almost as varied as the formulations themselves, and have been the subject of much comment.3 9 Among the many
formulations are objective, fixed standards and flexible standards. An objective, fixed standard is considered preferable to a flexible, factoral analysis
because it allows for certainty, predictability, ease of application, and satisfies policy considerations. 40 If one conceptualizes culpability as a continuum
ascending from purely innocent conduct, through negligence, reckless behavior, knowing, and intentional action, the problem is exactly where recklessness fits on this line between negligent and knowing conduct.
scienter under certain circumstances. Nevertheless, because recklessness was "closer to being a
lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negligence," the trial court's
finding of negligence invalidated any reckless conduct argument. Id at 767 (citing Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Recently, in Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980), the
court noted that evidence of intent or recklessness was essential to establish scienter. Id. at 862.
33. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 102 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971). See Edward J. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 595-96 (10th Cir. 1979)
(knowledge equated with willful action).
34. See generally Recklessness and Rule lOb-5, supra note 17, at 819.
35. 425 U.S. 185, 193-94 n.12.
36. Id at 197.
37. See Kaler, supra note 19, at 342-43. Kaler adds a third criterion, duty, based on: the
Seventh Circuit's ratto decidendi in favor of the plaintiff, Hochfelder; a footnote in the majority's
opinion (see 425 U.S. at 214-16 n.33); and the grounds for Justice Blackmun's Hochfelder dissent
(425 U.S. at 215-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
38. Kaler, supra note 19, at 343.
39. See id. at 344-51 (should have known, must have known, carelessness, and flexible duty
standards); Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" After Hochfelder and Aaron, 8
SEC. REG. L.J. 179, 191-208 (1980) (barely reckless, highly reckless, pre-Hochfelder, and flexible
duty standards); Recklessness and Rule lOb-5, supra note 17, at 819 n.8 (fiduciary duty, should have
known, must have known, and flexible duty standards).
40. The Ninth Circuit at one time subscribed to a flexible duty standard comprised of five
factors to be considered by juries in determining the duty owed by a Rule IOb-5 defendant. See
White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). Such a standard results in scienter requirements
which vary from case to case depending on the facts. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note
39, at 203-04. Insofar as the standard contemplated is negligence, its use was proscribed by
Hochfelder. Nevertheless, there is still uncertainty regarding the status of the flexible duty standard. Id at 203-08. Further, inasmuch as Blue Chip Stamps, Hochfelder, and Chiarella reflect the
Supreme Court's attempts to provide more certainty under Rule 1Ob-3 through a series of substantive pronouncements and a departure from previous liberal interpretations of the securities
laws, the flexible duty analysis appears similarly incompatible. See.Ruder,judicial Developments
Under Rule lob-5. Standing, Sienter, Reliance, Materiality and Implied Rtghts ofAction, 7 INST. SEC.
REG. 303 (1976) and supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
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Under common law fraud, recklessness is best seen as a species of imputed knowing conduct. 4 ' The actor's knowledge of the truth of his statements is implied from the objective circumstances surrounding his
conduct. 4 2 The theoretical distinctions may thus be described as: the negligent actor should have known; the reckless actor must have known; the
knowing actor had actual knowledge. 43 The most prevalent definition of
recklessness among the circuits reflects this common law classification:
[R]eckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable, negligence,
but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and
which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
44
have been aware of it.
Theoretically, 4 5 this definition has several merits. The "must have known"
language clearly distinguishes recklessness from negligence, and actual proof
of subjective knowledge is not required. Constructive knowledge may be
imputed from the surrounding objective circumstances. The definition satisfies the requirements of objectivity and predictability, while not imposing on
plaintiffs the onerous burden of proving a defendant's subjective state of
mind, thus striking an equitable balance. 46 Furthermore, because the definition "comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater
degree of ordinary negligence," 4 7 it should reduce the size of the potential
class of Rule 10b-5 plaintiffs, comporting with the recent shift in judicial
policy. 48 This definition, with minor variations, has been adopted by six
49
circuits.
The Hackbart court noted that its previous decisions implicitly accepted
reckless behavior as sufficient to meet the scienter requirement. Thus, it had
no difficulty explicitly adopting this standard. The court then found that
the prevalent definition of reckless behavior was the best definition and
adopted it. 50
41. See Recklessness and Rule Iob-5, supra note 17, at 823-24.
42. W. PROSSER,supra note 22, § 107 at 701.
43. See Recklessness and Rule Ob-5, supra note 17, at 824-25.
44. Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir. 1977) (quoting
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 429 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).
45. From a practical standpoint, proof of the defendant's subjective state of mind proceeds
from objective evidence. Although an honest belief that the representation is true negates the
required finding of scienter, the unreasonableness of the belief is most often strong evidence that
it does not exist. See W. PRossER, supra note 22, § 107 at 701. This focus on the reasonableness

of belief results in a blurring of the distinction between negligence and recklessness. See Newton,
supra note 21, at 90. Accord Note, supra note 32, at 351.
46. See Recklessness and Rule Iob-5, supra note 17, at 837.
47. Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. See Steinberg & Gruenbaum, supra note 39, at 198, and supra text accompanying notes
19-20.
49. See Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir. 1980), cer. denied, 454
U.S. 965 (1981); McClean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co.,
570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977). It was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Hackbart, 675 F.2d
at 1118.
50. 675 F.2d at 1118.
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In applying this definition, the Hackbarl court closely examined the trial
court's factual finding of recklessness. 5 ' Under the particular facts presented
by the case, the court had little difficulty in its task. As the trial court found,
neither Holmes nor his attorney explicitly informed Hackbart of the nonparticipating nature of his stock. 5 2 Furthermore, neither the articles of incorporation, the share certificates, nor any other corporate document adequately described the stocks' rights or preferences, 53 thus failing to comply
with Colorado law. 54 Additionally, Hackbart's share certificates indicated
he owned common stock. 55 The first financial statement of the corporation
showed only common stock outstanding. 56 Hackbart testified that Holmes
showed him the original financial statement and, pointing to the equity section, told him that his share of the company had increased. 57 The trial court
concluded that neither the discussions between the parties nor the documents available to the plaintiff provided adequate notice of the plaintiff's
rights, or the extent to which the original deal had been changed.5
After reversing the trial court's findings of fact, the court determined
that Holmes' behavior presented such an obvious danger of misleading the
plaintiff that Holmes must have been aware of it. 5 9 Holmes knew the plaintiff expected to share in the ownership of the corporation, but failed to explain adequately the change in plans. Furthermore, Holmes knew the
plaintiff was naive in business affairs, but made no effort to ascertain if he
understood the terms of the deal, or verify the accuracy of the corporate
documents. Under these circumstances, the court had no difficulty upholding the trial court's finding that Holmes acted with reckless disregard for the
truth.60
In Loveridge v. .Dreagoux,6 1 the defendants sold the plaintiffs the last two
debentures in a series of twenty debentures for $5000 each. Proceeds from
the sale were to be used to finance a joint venture to import commodities
from the Philippines. 6 2 Although the plaintiffs received the last numbered
debentures, only one other was sold. The proceeds of the sale were utilized
before the defendants ever engaged in the intended business. The trial court
found the defendants' action in connection with this sale to be in violation of
63
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
51.

As a finding of fact, it would not be disturbed upon appeal unless clearly erroneous. Id.

52. Id
53. Id at 1119.
54. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-2-102(e) (1973) requires that the articles of incorporation con-

tain a statement of the preferences, limitations, and relative rights of each class of stock. Section
7-4-108(2) requires that each share certificate set forth a full statement of the designations, preferences, limitations, and relative rights of the shares of each class of stock to be issued.
55. 675 F.2d at 1119. The trial court found, however, that this was the result of clerical
error and not intentional. Id
56. Id at 1119-20. The shareholder's equity section was corrected on later financial statements. d
57. Id
58. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

675 F.2d at 1120.
Id
678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982).
Id at 873.
d
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On appeal, the defendants argued that there had been no finding of
scienter. After disposing of a jurisdictional question, 64 the Tenth Circuit responded that under the facts of the case, a specific finding of scienter was
unnecessary. 6 5 The trial court had made several findings of the defendants'
knowing misrepresentations. These included the defendants' representations
that all, not one, of the earlier numbered debentures had been sold;6 6 his
representations that the corporation was formally organized when actual incorporation took place subsequent to the sale;6 7 and representations that the
proceeds would be used to lease ships, when in reality the money was utilized
to pay pre-incorporation expenses. 68 Under these specific facts, the court
found implicit in the trial court's findings that the defendant either knew of
the falsity of the information or acted in reckless disregard of its truth and
with the intent to deceive or mislead the plaintiffs. A specific finding by the
69
trial court that scienter had been established was not necessary.
II.

SCIENTER AND

SEC

INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS

In two brief opinions, the Tenth Circuit had its first opportunity to apply the rule laid down inAaron v. SEC.70 The Aaron Court held that proof of
scienter was a requisite element when the SEC seeks to enjoin violations of
section 17(a)(l) of the 1934 Act, 7 ' section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and Rule
lOb-5. Scienter was found not to be a requirement under sections 17(a)(2)
and (a)(3). 72 However, the Court noted that scienter was not to be disregarded in connection with section 17(a)(2) and (a)(3) actions. In order for
the SEC to enjoin future violations of these sections, Aaron requires the
charging party to establish that the future violations of the law are likely to
occur. The degree of intentional wrongdoing in the defendant's past behavior is an important element in proving the likelihood of future violations.
District courts were counseled by the Aaron opinion that they might appropriately consider scienter (or the lack of it) when exercising their equitable
64. Defendants argued that their contacts with the plaintiffs by intrastate telephone calls
were insufficient to establish that interstate commerce was involved. The court rejected this
argument, 678 F.2d at 873-74 (citing Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.
1974)).
65. 678 F.2d at 876.
66. Id. at 875.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id at 876.
70. 446 U.S. 680 (1980). The two Tenth Circuit cases were submitted on appeal prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron.
77
71. 15 U.S.C. § q (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
7
72. Id. § 7 q(a)(2), (3).

1983]

SECURITIES

73
discretion in deciding whether to issue an injunction.

In SEC v. Haswell,74 the defendant was charged with violating section
17(a) and the registration provisions of the 1933 Act 75 and the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1934 Act. 76 The Commission sought to enjoin those violations. 77 The district court, anticipating the Supreme Court's holding in
Aaron, concluded that proof of scienter was required before a court could
enjoin the violations. The district court found that the defendant had not
violated any of the provisions. Furthermore, the district court held that even
if the defendant had violated the securities laws, an injunction would be
denied because there was no reasonable likelihood the defendant's behavior
78
would be repeated.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found the issue squarely settled by
Aaron. 79 The fact the trial court had failed to differentiate between section
17(a)(1) requiring scienter and sections 17(a)(2) and (a) (3), not requiring scienter, did not compel reversal. The court relied on language in Aaron discussing the relevance of scienter in actions under sections 17(a) (2) and (a) (3)
to prove the likelihood of future violations80 The court summarized the
Aaron Court's treatment of this issue: "The presence or absence of scienter in
a defendant's past conduct, even if that conduct constitutes a violation of the
securities laws absent scienter, is a circumstance which bears heavily on a
district court's decision to issue an injunction.""'
The court found additional support from Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Aaron.8 2 The Chief Justice wrote that in order to prove the reasonable likelihood of repeated wrongs, "it would almost always be necessary to
demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the result of more than
negligence." 8 3 Applying these principles, the Tenth Circuit concluded that
even assuming the defendant had violated sections 17(a)(2) and (a)(3), the
trial court's finding that the defendant lacked scienter sufficiently supported
84
the denial of the injunction.
Similarly, in SEC v. Mik Stack Associates,8 5 the Tenth Circuit applied
the Aaron principles and remanded the case. The district court had granted
summary judgment and injunctive relief in the section 10(b), Rule lOb-5,
and Rule lOb-13 8 6 action prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Aaron.
73. Id at 701.
74. 654 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1981).
75. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c) (1976).
76. Id. § 78j.
77. Authority to seek injunctive relief is provided under § 20(b) of the 1933 Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b) (1976)) and § 21(d) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78u(d). (1976)).
78. 654 F.2d at 698-99. When the Commission seeks an injunction barring future actions
that "will constitute" a violation of § 17(a)(2) or § 17(a)(3), there must be proof that a future
violation will occur. Aaron, 446 U.S. at 702.
79. 654 F.2d at 699.
80. See supra text accompanying note 65.
81. 654 F.2d at 699.
82. Id at 700. See Aaron, 446 U.S. at 702 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
83. Id. at 703.
84. 654 F.2d at 700.
85. 675 F.2d 1148 (10th Cir. 1982).
86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1982). This rule prohibits a person who has made a tender
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However, the SEC had not alleged scienter in its complaint, nor had the
district court made specific findings of scienter. 8 7 In light of the Aaron requirement that scienter be pleaded and proven in a section 10(b) action, the
court remanded for a determination of whether the pleadings could "be
amended to permit appropriate allegations." 88 The court required specific
findings regarding the presence of scienter.
The court also held that, on remand the SEC must prove scienter with
respect to the alleged Rule lOb-13 violation. 89 This issue was not addressed
in Aaron. The Tenth Circuit used reasoning from Hochfelder to arrive at its
conclusion. The Hochfelder Court found that because the SEC's rulemaking
powers were derived from the authority of section 10(b), that section's requirement of scienter applied equally to rules promulgated under its authority. The Tenth Circuit found such reasoning was applicable where the
Commission had alleged manipulation and deceptive practices under section
10(b) through open market purchases during a tender offer.9° The court
failed to address whether a showing of scienter was required "to sustain all
alleged violations of Rule 10b-13 absent specific allegations of manipulative
and deceptive practices in connection with open market purchases of the
target's securities during an announced tender offer." 91
III.

DUE DILIGENCE AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In both Hackbart v. Holmes 92 and Loveridge v. Dreagoux,93 the defendants
contended that the applicable statute of limitations barred the actions. Defendants argued that the plaintiffs had, or by exercise of due diligence should
have, discovered the facts constituting the fraud at a much earlier date. In
both cases, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courts' findings that the
actions were not barred.
Both section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 contain no specific statute of limitations provision. Suits brought under these federal laws are subject to the
limitations period for actions of the same type in the state where the alleged
violation occurred. 9 4 This follows from the rule that state statutes govern
limitations on federal causes of action unless Congress has specifically provided otherwise. 95 In determining the applicable limitations period, states
offer for a company's shares from purchasing that company's shares on the open market during
the pending tender offer.
87. "When the substantive law changes while a case is pending appeal, the general rule
requires that the appellate court apply the law in effect at the time the appeal is to be decided,
so long as manifest in justice does not occur." 675 F.2d at 1149. See also Bradley v. Richmond
School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711-21 (1974); Key v. Rutherford, 645 F.2d 880, 883 (10th Cir. 1981).
88. 675F.2d at 1150.
89. Id at 1150 n.1.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
93. 678 F.2d 870 (lOth Cir. 1982).
94. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 n.29 (1976); Hackbart v. Holmes,
675 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036,
1041 (10th Cir. 1980).
95. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966); M'Cluny v. Sillerman, 28 U.S.
(3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
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choose between their respective Blue Sky Laws or fraud statutes. The decision rests upon which statute bears the closest resemblance to the particular
federal statute involved. 96 Although the factors considered in selecting the
appropriate limitations period are fairly well agreed upon, their application
97
yields different results.
In Hackbart the parties had agreed that Colorado's three-year statute of
limitations for fraud applied.98 Under this statute, the limitations period
begins the day the fraud was committed. The court noted that there was
uncertainty over whether Colorado or federal law governed the tolling of the
statute. However, under both Colorado and federal law, the limitations period is tolled until the aggrieved party either learns of the fraud, or should
have discovered it through reasonable diligence. 99 Hackbart asserted that
he did not learn of his lack of equity ownership until 1977, when he and
Holmes terminated their relationship. Holmes argued that if Hackbart had
exercised reasonable diligence, he would have discovered the nature of his
ownership at the time he purchased the stock, which was 1972, well beyond
the three-year limitations period.' 00
The trial court found that Hackbart did not learn the true nature of his
ownership interest until February 1977, and assessed damages as of that
date.' 0 ' The Tenth Circuit found that the trial court implicitly concluded
that Hackbart would not have discovered the fraud earlier.10 2 The court
96. See Comment, Whether the Statute of Limitations for Common Law Fraud on the Blue Sky
Limitation Period Should be Appled in a Federal Securities Claim is Decided by Determining Which State
Cause ofAction Bears the Closest Resemblance to the Federal Cause ofAction Created Under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 10(b) andRule lOb-5-IDS Progressive Fund Inc. v. First of Mich. Corp., 4
N. Ky. L. REV. 175 (1977).
97. Id. at 177. For examples of circuits applying state fraud statutes see Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980); Nickels v. Koehler Mgt. Corp., 541 F.2d
611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977); United Cal. Bank v. Salik, 481 F.2d 1012
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1004 (1973); Klein v. Shields & Co., 470 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1972);
Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
For examples of federal appellate courts applying state Blue Sky Laws, see Fox v. KaneMiller Corp., 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976); In re Alodex Corp., 533 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1976),
Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 532 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1976),cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042
(1977).
98. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973). Colorado's blue sky analogue to § 10(b),
CoLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (Supp. 1981), does not provide for any specific statute of limitations. However, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) provides for a two-year statute of limitations for all actions founded upon a federal statute, or the period specified for comparable
actions under Colorado law, whichever is longer. As a result, courts interpreting the scheme
have applied the three-year period prescribed by the state fraud statutes CoLo. REV. STAT.
§§ 13-80-108, -109 (1973). See Ohio v. Peterson, Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 472 F. Supp. 402
(D. Colo. 1979) af'd, 651 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
99. Hackbart, 675 F.2d at 1120. The court cited Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d
1036, 1041 (10th Cir. 1980), for the proposition that the law was unsettled regarding the applicability of federal or state law to tolling. The confusion arises from Board of Regents v. Tomiano, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). The Supreme Court in Tomiano held that in a civil rights action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, courts must apply both state statutes of limitations and state tolling principles. The Tenth Circuit in Ohio v. Peterson Lowry, Rail, Barber & Ross, 651 F.2d 687 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 895 (1981), expressly decided that Tomiano applied only to civil rights
actions and that federal tolling rules applied in cases under the federal securities acts. 651 F.2d
at 691.
100. 675 F.2d at 1121-22.
101. Id
102. Id. Although Holmes argued that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, Hackbart
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found substantial evidence to support the trial court's conclusion; this evidence consisted of Hackbart's conversations with Holmes and his accountant, Hackbart's business naivete, and Holmes' failure to disclose the change
0 3
in plans. 1
In Loveridge v. Dreagoux,'10 4 the defendants argued that plaintiffs were
put on notice regarding the problems of the securities at the time of the
purchase and that plaintiffs should have inquired about the other purchasers. Alternatively, they argued because plaintiffs were promised quarterly
reports and none were issued, they should have been aware of problems by
05
the second or third quarter after the purchase.'
The Utah statute of limitations for fraud provides that actions must be
brought within three years of the fraud. The cause of action does not accrue
until the aggrieved party discovers the facts constituting the fraud. 10 6 In
rejecting the defendants' argument concerning the timing of plaintiffs' notice, the trial court found that the statute did not begin to run until after the
maturity date of the debentures when plaintiffs discovered that no payments
would be made. 10 7 As in Hackbari, under the particular facts of the case, the
Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's findings.
IV.

BENEFIT-OF-THE-BARGAIN

DAMAGES

In Hackbart v. Holmes, the trial court applied a benefit-of-the-bargain 08
measure of damages and awarded the plaintiff forty-nine percent of the
value of the company as of the date the parties terminated their relationship. 10 9 On appeal, the defendant argued that the usual measure of damages in securities fraud cases was out-of-pocket damages.10 This measure of
damages would have limited the plaintiff to a recovery of the $5000 paid for
the ownership interest." 'I
The Tenth Circuit agreed that the out-of-pocket loss was the customary
measure, but found support for allowing a trial court discretion in fashioning
should have discovered the fraud, the court failed to discuss this contention, or define reasonable diligence. Id. at 1120.
103. Id See also supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
104. 678 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1982).
105. Id at 875.
106. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) (1953). Utah's § 10(b) analogue, UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 61-1-1 (1953), carries a two year statute of limitations under UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-22(5)
(1953 & Supp. 1981). The statute has been held not to give rise to a private right of action.
Milliner v. Elmer Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974). Therefore the Utah fraud statutes of
limitatiorr controls in § 10(b) actions.

107. 678 F.2d at 875.
108. Benefit-of-the-bargain damages is usually taken to mean the difference between the
value of the security purchased as represented by the defendant, and the fair value of the security on the day of sale. Some courts will, however, consider the value at a date subsequent to the
purchase. See Jacobs, The Measure of Damages in Rule 1Oh-5 Cases, 65 GEO. L.J. 1093, 1108-09
(1977). See a/so W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 110 at 734.
109. 675 F.2d at 1121.
110. Out-of-pocket damages generally means the fair value of the consideration paid minus
the fair value of the security received (if the security is still held). See Jacobs, supra note 108, at
1099-102. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 22, § 110 at 733-34.
111. 675 F.2d at 1121.
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a remedy peculiar to the particular case.' 12 However, this was unnecessary.
The court found that the trial court's damage award could be sustained as
an out-of-pocket loss because the plaintiff had relinquished his right to a
forty-nine percent ownership interest in the prosperous corporation.1 13 After
mentioning these alternative justifications, the court upheld the award under
the unjust enrichment exception to the Rule lOb-5 out-of-pocket loss standard.' 14 The court noted that unjust enrichment occurs when fraud is used
to induce another to sell securities that subsequently increase in value, but
may also occur when an innocent party is induced to purchase securities.' ' 5
The award of forty-nine percent of the value of the business was seen by the
court as giving the plaintiff credit for his years of hard work while the company prospered, and was thus necessary to prevent Holmes' unjust
enrichment.' 16
V.

CONCLUSION

The most significant contribution to the status of securities law in the
Tenth Circuit was the adoption of an objective recklessness standard to satisfy the scienter requirement in private damage actions under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. The definition of recklessness utilized comports well with
the changed judicial policy in favor of reducing the number of actions
brought under the general anti-fraud sections of the federal securities laws,
yet does not unduly burden plaintiffs by requiring a more difficult subjective
standard of proof. The objective standard also provides needed certainty
and predictability for participants in the securities markets. The court's decisions in other areas of securities law-SEC injunctive actions, statutes of
limitations, and damages, while following well-established principles and
precedents, provided further clarification and guidance.
RichardP Manczak

112. Id (citing Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1978); Blackie
v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cerl. dented, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971)).
113. The court seems to be taking notice of the concept of "sweat equity," familiar to entrepreneurs, whereby actual management of an enterprise is substituted for capital. See infra text
accompanying note 116. Under tlie general rule in federal courts, only the out-of-pocket measure is allowed, but it may include "such outlays as are attributable to the defendant's fraudulent conduct." Estate Counseling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 303 F.2d
527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962).
114. 675 F.2d at 1122. "Preventing unjust enrichment is a well-recognized exception to the
rule limiting damages to the out-of-pocket loss." Id (citing Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir. 1978); Zeller v. Bogue
Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973);Janigan v. Taylor, 344
F.2d 781 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965)).

115. 675 F.2d at 1122.
116. Id.

